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Notes re: constitution 
Wes Jones 
Form is truly bounded only by the lim-
its of dimension. Why do we invent so 
narrowly from this infinitude? 
We avoid those forms which, in their 
alien-ness, point to an infinitude of 
possibility that contrasts so with our 
own "limited" condition. They are the 
un-familiar which witness our mortali-
ty. We also avoid those (other) forms 
which, in their indifference, reflect the 
infinitude of sameness that too strongly 
limits our own condition They are the 
too familiar which make our mortality 
interminable. We "are" on the edge be-
tween these two-this is where we like 
our form. Apart from some voyeuristic 
intrigue which does not sustain us, we 
are really only interested in what we 
can know, what we might already sus-
pect, what is an extension of ourselves. 
It is only here at this edge that we may 
"find" meaning. Though meaning de-
pends on the difference which it cross-
es, it can only reach the "other side" if 
there is another side, and it is somehow 
not. In this sense the alien is interest-
ing only for the critical contrast it pro-
vides which highlights the mechanism 
of meaning and its necessary con-
straints. In fact, this constrained world 
of expectation can be seen as an exter-
nal mapping of our selves, a record of 
the inhibitions that define us as what 
we may know-and as other than the 
other we fear. 
This is the context in which the idea of 
constitution has the greatest effect: 
4 "constitution" is ultimately the estab-
lishment of a bulwark of constraint 
against otherness. It sets out the fron-
tiers of meaning, it provides difference 
with a certain resolution. To constitute 
is to create, out and away from limitless 
possibility, a position which marginal-
izes and then eliminates real otherness; 
to constitute is to set up and maintain a 
world, here, despite the other, there. 
A call for re-constitution suggests that 
the constraining limits are wearing 
out and that otherness is seeping 
through. To some this possibility is to 
be celebrated as a means to greater 
freedom. They seek only (de-con)sti-
tution. Others see this as anarchy and 
bemoan the loss of meaning in the 
world, proposing re-constitution. Still 
others mourn this loss, but distrust at-
tempts to rehydrate versions of the 
original and prefer to imagine that a 
new constitution could be written. 
By setting up and maintaining a dis-
tinct, knowable world the constitu-
tional act provides the comfort and 
certainty of familiarity. The constitu-
tional act carries, or manufactures, a 
sense of inevitability. We speak of it 
as natural. It gives us conviction 
about the order of things that might 
have given rise to it. The reference to 
naturalness is not accidental or casual. 
The "naturalness" of that act is the 
sign of its connection to the ultimate 
authority, nature. Ironically, of course, 
nature is itself the other. It is the en-
tire reservoir of possibility. Yet, it be-
comes foundational because it must: 
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unlike everything else to which possi-
biliry, Nature could not be otherwise. 
It simply is what is . It always provides 
a backstop to meaning, an answer to 
difference. In a final desperate act to 
defeat otherness we give ourselves 
over to this larger inevitability, Na-
ture. We find comfort in this in-
evitability; it is our only recourse to 
certainty. Architecture in particular 
has followed this principle and drawn 
its form from this source-since ulti-
mately it is the only source. The consti-
tutional act particularizes this general 
inevitability, giving it a human face. 
As an assurance of "uniqueness," and 
"priority," inevitability gives value to 
originality. The idea of Origin is the 
means by which we approximate Na-
ture's inevitability. Nature is first of 
all: prior to all meaning. Priority con-
fers legitimacy to the constitutional 
activity which generates first meaning, 
rendering that meaning inevitable. 
When originality is established, in-
evitability follows ; when the inevi-
tability is sensed, origin is expected. 
Yet, to "set-up or establish" supposes 
"in the first place" a prior lack. If the 
authority of this establishment de-
pends on its irreducibility, then aware-
ness of this former lack only serves to 
undermine the inevitability of that au-
thority. Those who celebrate de-con-
stitution revel in the provisionality of 
this initial establishment, and its ax-
iomatic nature. 
The idea of the axiom answers the 
dilemma of beginning: if ex nihilo, 
nihil fit, then there must already be a 
something with which to begin. The 
axiomatic beginning is found in "self-
evidence": the chain of reduction that 
arrives at the axiom compels the ax-
iom to be the limit, and thus the be-
ginning, because it hasn' t the per-
spective to question the question-
ing-leaving the axiom as so basic 
within the system that it must be "be-
yond proof." The standard of proof, 
legislated by the pre-existing system 
that the axiom is created to found, 
thus negatively defines its relationship 
to its most basic eleme~t. From the 
provisional origin then proceeds a 
post-rationalized evolution which mi-
raculously explains the context that 
legislated the axiom. Given that con-
text, the intention behind these ef-
forts disappears into "nature," and 
with it the "post-" which undermines 
the rationalization by remembering 
its provisionality. Like the sand in the 
oyster or Laugier's primitive hut, the 
axiom is necessary to begin the process, 
but, if the process succeeds, it is swal-
lowed during its course and disappears 
into the inevitability of the product. 
(Pamphlet Architecture 12, Building; 
Machines) 
The axiom intends to convince us that 
before the beginning is nothing, noth-
ing that need concern us, but the de-
constitutionists spoil it to remind us 
that after the end is forever. If the au-
thority that seems inevitable is shown 
to be motivated, or if the anchors we 
depend on for security are shown to 
be restraints founded on nothing more 
substantial than whatever first came 
to mind, then we should be free to in-
vent or dismiss either, forever. While 
beginning may seem to be as far away 
from the End as possible, and as free 
from infinitude as could be imag-
ined-and while an obsession with its 
clarity would seem to be proof against 
fear and uncertainty, it is also the be-
ginning which gives to time its sinis-
ter direction. 
Re-constitution calls into question the 
absoluteness of time as a datum. 
When the beginning recedes too far in 
the memory-perhaps when the end 
is more palpable-we consider reviv-
ing the beginning. Not a new, or dif-
ferent beginning, which can only 
evolve as a response to otherness, bur 
the same beginning, again, re-hydrat-
ed. In an attempt to re-invigorate its 
"present," re-constitution risks trivial-
izing the passage of time which oth-
erwise gives to Architecture its most 
basic role as conservator. It strips the 5 
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object of the history that ensnares it 
and determines the greatest part of its 
meaning. In re-constitution, the clock 
is re-set-up. History is emptied of the 
relationships and meaning that distin-
guish it from time. 
The call for re-constitution responds 
to the desire to feel that particular 
"rightness" that marks artifacts of an 
authentic constitutional period. The 
temporal portability of those objects 
which survive from some such a be-
ginning, confuses our understanding 
of that datum dividing them from 
now. We value the surviving artifacts 
as evidence of that history and pre-
sume that the rightness they commu-
nicate to us now is what they commu-
nicated then in their original, "natur-
al context." They become fetishes, fo-
cusing our longing for the optimism 
or certainty we feel attends constitu-
tional activity. Eventually they come 
to substitute for the period they recall, 
and we attempt to regain those feel-
ings by replicating those objects. 
Yet, such work can really have au-
thentic meaning only in its own, no 
longer extent, context. "The works are 
no longer the same as they once were. 
It is they themselves, to be sure, that 
we encounter. .. , but they themselves 
are gone by ... Henceforth they remain 
merely such objects." (M. Heideggar, 
"Origin of the Work of Art"). We can 
neither know for sure whether our 
present reactions reflect those origi-
nally inspired by such objects, nor if 
the original reactions themselves are 
what we assume. 
To recover is to re-COVER-the orig-
inal condition which is sought is irre-
trievably lost in time. The survival of 
objects, whether through their intrin-
sic merit, or for their "historical" value, 
does not in itself enable a passage 
across time or a resetting of the clock. 
In attempting to rekindle the spark of 
authenticity from the best stuff of even 
the recent past, we fail to realize that 
an authentic constitutional effort today 
must arise out of its contemporary con-
text: it cannot be recovered from any 
past and be authentic in the present. 
Authentic means "genuine. " This sug-
gests a "presentness" or being "in the 
moment," yet almost paradoxically, 
authenticity is only retroactively un-
derstood or credited. Because of this 
presentness the truly authentic act 
never has the perspective or self-con-
sciousness to be aware of its own au-
thenticity, and certainly not as some-
thing to direct its efforts nor can it be 
concerned about what might consti-
tute the later determination of that 
authenticity. In this respect, authen-
ticity is innocent of its own historici-
ty. If we covet this authenticity we vi-
olate its innocence. Consequently, au-
thenticity more often comes to mind 
in being questioned: the "genuine" is 
valued precisely because of its origi-
nality-encouraging the imitations 
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from which it must distinguish itself 
as genuine. Yet, it is precisely when 
something is identified as genuine or 
"authentic" that suspicions are raised. 
Something celebrated as authentic is 
almost certainly not, really. It be-
comes a challenge to the discriminat-
ing reader, rather than an assurance . 
The clear intentionality of constitu-
tional effort would seem to mitigate its 
opportunities for "authenticity." Ei-
ther innocence or inevitability are for-
eign to either a heroic or critical con-
ception of constitution. Yet it is tope-
riods of constitutional activity that we 
most often appeal for examples of au-
thenticity-and it is authenticity that 
is sought in the call for re-constitution. 
Between the innocence and timeliness 
that is retrospectively seen in an au-
thentic object, shines the willfulness 
which grounds the object in its own 
time and context. The fervor of this 
will ensures a certain innocence, its 
directedness ensures a certain timeli-
ness. While this prevents the signifi-
cant translation of this work, itself, to 
other times, it ensures the continuing 
emergence of new constitutional acts. 
This should be cause for hope. It 
should mean that the coveted sense of 
rightness can be invented or set-up 
again. It should mean, then, that we 
are not completely prisoners of cir-
cumstance, that we can again achieve 
that authenticity, willfully, without 
having to wait around for it to just 
happen, or trying to recover or re-an-
imate it from historical artifacts. 
The work done during the revolution-
ary phase of the Modern movement 
bootstrapped itself into existence as a 
socially aware, formal reaction to the 
nostalgia of the nineteenth century. In 
this sense, it was hardly innocent or 
timely, defining itself directly in terms 
of this opposition. It was the product 
of the first generation to consciously 
express authenticity's embarrassment 
by nostalgia. This awareness, however, 
did not prevent their participation in 
the dynamic and in this lies the real 
innocence and topicality that is only 
evident in retrospect. Its expressed 
neo-constitutive program avoided the 
nostalgic trivialization of time by 
maintaining the abstraction of any 
qualities it attempted to recover from 
its past: it sought ideas, not objects; 
stories, not forms. Corbu claimed to 
be re-covering the clarity of the past-
the elemental nature of certain forms 
(Phileban solids) of Roman architec-
ture, and the "terrible" refinement of 
the Greek-not the imagery itself. 
The modernist formal preoccupation 
was unmistakably contemporary. 
What today can be authentic? What 
today might be a source of innocent 
timeliness? Paradoxically, it is the con-
temporary (hyper) awareness asking 
this question which seems to prevent a 
satisfying answer. The present es-
trangement for Architecture's larger 
public responsibility is both a result of 
this awareness (the false modesty of 
avoiding the repressiveness of author-
ity) and the chief impediment to its 
evolution. Today's visions, though 
they may be adopted generally, as "the 
fashion," are for the most part person-
al. To again "achieve" authenticity, 
Architecture 's essential publicness 
must turn "innocence" away from the 
"personal," and "timeliness" away 
from narrow topicality. It must again 
fix what is natural for us and what is 
other. It must show us the edge where 
authentic meaning can be produced. 
A concern for what might be the nat-
ural thing to do seems lost today with-
in the greater interest in critique. The 
gaze is focussed over the edge, out-
ward, rather than along it. Interest in 
this frontier is taken by and as critique 
to be a license to doubt, rather than 
assure. The limits are seen as barriers 
to us, rather than to otherness, and the 
cry is out to destroy them. The archi-
tect is expected to go over the top and 
"take a position." 
Unfortunately, the position so taken 
demonstrates only the plurality which 
is anarchitecture. Necessarily a cri-
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rique, it generally assumes the unlike-
lihood of a larger, continuous vision 
that might be expressed by Architec-
ture, instead, by its own example it im-
plies this vision must be posed anew at 
every site, as a unique, and most often 
highly personal, statement. 
In a narrow sense to constitute is itself 
to "set-up or establish" a position. 
And in a still narrower sense Architec-
ture itself is a "position": architecture 
has been established as an area staked 
out between Art and utility. Objec-
tively only a statement of intent, the 
label "Architecture" covers the a col-
lection of practices filling the space 
framed between these two. It intends, 
however, much more: to constitute 
whatever (necessarily axiomatic) bul-
wark of certainty that man can find or 
declare in the face of Otherness. 
To "take a position" regarding this 
"position," which any critical or nos-
talgic Architectural statement implies, 
exposes the axiomatic, "positional" 
nature of Architecture itself, under-
mining its usefulness as a constitu-
tional presence. The axiomatic reality 
of the constitutional enterprise re-
quires that the position become invis-
ible as a position-if the system that 
it builds is to foster any sense of con-
fidence. Neither the nostalgic repli-
cation, as unintentional dissimula-
tion, nor the critical pose, as a pur-
poseful un-masking activity, ever re-
cede into the systems they sponsor. 
Such activity cannot pretend to the 
sort of universal validity that constitu-
tional efforts assume for themselves . 
When its genesis is so obviously 
"questionable," the object must al-
ways appear sheepish. Such activity 
says "look at me"-it asks the viewer 
to see the building as an expression of 
the Architect's will. Architecture, on 
the other hand, says "see yourselves, 
writ large, in me"-throughout the 
building it expresses society's will and 
the nature of things. 
This is not to say that Architects can-
not be strong willed. When the will 
is linked to that of the larger public, it 
becomes magnified: the utopian vi-
sions ofLe Corbusier and Wright am-
plified the willfullness of their Archi-
tecture without compromising its 
originality or authorship. Indeed, it 
was by attending to a larger vision of 
society that they were given the drive 
to find the new forms which forced 
back the limiting otherness. 
Architecture is never truly innocent, 
otherwise it would be building. It is 
never timely or it would not endure. 
Yet, Architecture's proper goal is still 
authenticity, but understood as the 
ever-frustrated dream of these, pre-
dicted in the present to be read in the 
future. Because Architecture seeks au-
thenticity, it has often been a site of 
nostalgia. If Architecture's proper goal 
is the authentic, the timeliness of our 
own understanding of this term must 
include the modesty which realizes 
that it is achievable only in retrospect. 
Illustrated is Holt Hinshaw jones ' compe-
tition entry for the Mariana Kistler Beach 
Art Museum at Kansas State University. 
The Project team was Tony Duncan, 
Michael Gough, jean Young jones, Wes 
jones, and Bob Shepherd. 
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